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Abstract: The differences between the Romanian and Soviet naval commandments would appear 
soon, even in the issue of the military collaboration with the aim of ensuring the seacoast against the 
danger represented by the German ships. The imperative requests for the admission of the war and 
auxiliary fleets would be received by the Romanian Commandment of the Romanian Naval Forces, 
namely by the Rear Admiral Horia Măcelariu, on August 29th, at a time when “the Romanian forces 
had already begun fighting against the German forces” (Dutu, 2000, p. 241). 
The character of these hostilities between the Romanian and German maritime 
units can be defined more precisely as actions of intimidation and mutual 
surveillance, the German forces having a technical endowment which was totally 
superior to the Romanian one. For this reason, “the Romanian Royal Navy forces 
are no longer able to take any armed action against the German naval and land 
forces, in Constanta and on Maritime Danube, the small actions that have taken 
place in these areas being considered as incidents”2. Without giving any 
importance to the military actions of the Romanian fleet, the Commander of the 
Soviet Fleet in the Black Sea, Admiral F.I. Oktiabrski, gave an ultimatum to the 
Romanian authorities, claiming that “all the Romanian war and auxiliary fleet 
should be moved to Sulina and handed over to the Soviet Maritime Command”3. 
According to the Soviet statement, “in the event of a refusal or failure to respond, 
the Soviet fleet will start attacking your fleet and base from the sea and air”4. The 
protests of the Romanian government and of the Romanian Navy would not cause 
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any significant change in the behavior of the Russian military navy units, the 
Operations Log of the Navy Commandment recording on August 30th that the new 
allies (emphasis added, Ş.Gh.) “Consider us still enemies or a country that has 
capitulated without conditions”1. The assessments would also be confirmed by the 
Russian Rear Admiral Azorov, who would establish, after the Soviet ships entered 
Constanţa port, a strict regime of control over the Romanian navy ships and storage 
facilities2. 
In spite of the arrogant and abusive position of the Soviet Commandment, the 
military authorities and the Romanian government would show a dignified attitude, 
urging the Navy crews to goodwill “until this difficult situation is over”. The 
persistence in imposing their point of view would only result in the delay of the 
total seizure of the Romanian fleet and in the internment of most of the Romanian 
crew members. The instructions from Bucharest provided “fierce protests”, and if 
not accepted, “the ships will be put at their disposal, under the same conditions as 
in Tulcea. Solutions such as interment and sinking ships are excluded”3. Significant 
are also the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the 
Romanian delegate affiliated to General F. I. Tolbukhin, commander of the 
Ukrainian III-rd Front, in order to discuss the military-economical and financial 
problems related to the presence of the Russian troops in Dobrogea4.  
The measures taken by the Soviets would not lead to an optimal collaboration with 
the Romanian side, the Romanian naval commandments being unable to perform 
their functional missions, making possible the incident caused by the German 
submarine in Constanţa port by torpedoing a Romanian ship and a Soviet one. The 
result would inevitably be a disaster for the Romanian Maritime Commandment, 
the natural consequence being “the accusation of the Romanian Commandments of 
sabotage and complicity with the German Navy from the Black Sea” and the 
                                                     
1 Ibidem, f 53. 
2 Ibidem, f 54. To be mentioned that the Soviet fleet, the first group of motor gun boats, would enter 
in Constanţa navigated by the Romanian motor gun boats “Dumitrescu” and “Ghiculescu”, as well as 
by Boat no. 7.  
3 Ibidem, f 46. The Romanian authorities accepted as last solution the replacement of the national flag 
with the white one and keeping the crews on board the ships at any cost. The exclusion of radical 
solutions, i.e. the sinking of the ships, showed that the Romanian side hoped the military and political 
relations with the Soviet Union would be regulated as soon as the Armistice Convention would be 
signed. The tough position of the two Soviet admirals, the commanders of the Russian inland and 
maritime forces, did not exclude the hypothesis, favorable to the Soviets, to eliminate by any means 
an unwanted military presence in the Black Sea waters. 
4 Idem, case 948, file no. 1558, f 136-137. 
ISSN: 2065-0272                                                             RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
59 
interruption of the Soviet Commandments’ contacts with the Romanian 
authorities1. Accordingly, the event would become an opportunity for an acute 
exacerbation of the suspicions and accusations from the Soviet side against the 
Romanian sailors and officers embarked on Romanian Navy ships. 
Foreseeing a possible unfavorable turn of events, the Romanian Navy Commander 
went to Bucharest to report the delicate situation the collaboration between the 
Romanians and Russians was in. The travel of Rear Admiral Horia Măcelariu to 
the Capital to report the situation in Dobrogea2 would be misinterpreted by the 
Soviets as another proof of the Romanian refusal to cooperate, this being the reason 
for which the abusive decision to disarm and intern the crews on board the 
respective ships on September 5th, 1944, was taken3. The severity of the measure 
adopted by the Soviets would force the Romanian government to send to the area 
“a delegate with the rank of admiral - at the request of the temporary 
commandment of the Navy in Constanţa, Commander Nicolae Bardescu - to clarify 
and restore contacts with the Soviet Naval Commandment”4.  
Rear Admiral Roman August would be appointed responsible with the above task 
on September 6th, 1944, who, in a first phase, would have contacts with the 
Dobrogea Military Commandment. In his report, the Romanian officer noted that 
“following to the events of September 5th, this year, by disarming the naval forces, 
the morale of this commandment was rather low, disorientation almost complete, 
while panic and terror ruled5. The report also states that among the senior officers 
and other Romanian sailors in Constanţa there is a state of “extreme moral 
breakdown”6.  The desire of the Romanian Rear Admiral to meet as soon as 
possible with the leaders of the Soviet Naval Commandment could not be 
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achieved, as his insistence did not receive any response1. The conclusions of the 
meeting with the Soviet General would make Rear Admiral Roman August to say 
that: 
Since the arrival of the Soviet Naval Commandment in Constanta, a very hostile 
attitude and a total lack of trust in the Romanian Navy had been observed. 
The Soviet Commandment initially asked the Romanian Navy for close and 
friendly cooperation between the two sides. 
All subsequent requests made by the Soviet Naval Commandment were made in an 
ultimatum type of tone and, when these could not be solved immediately, the tone 
would become offensive. 
The disarmament of our ships on September 5th was based on certain groundless 
reasons of the Soviet side. 
The irritation and hostility of the Soviet officers seemed to have a reason - the 
Romanian officer mentioned - the military successes of the Romanian Royal Navy, 
the fact that it could not capture the German fleet ships which left free from the 
port and the existence of ships in the port that had been announced as sank by the 
Russian Commandment. In parallel, it was shown that both the Commandments 
and the Marine Corps of Constanţa did and do everything in their power to 
establish good relations with the Soviet ones and to “regain their full trust in the 
Romanian Navy”2. 
For all these efforts, the Romanian crews would be interned3, the ships sailed to the 
Soviet ports under Soviet flag, and the Romanian sailors were disarmed and 
humiliated. For many of them, the military career would be discontinued here, 
others would find refuge by joining “Horia, Cloşca şi Crişan” division as 
volunteers, and some would return from the Soviet Union much too late4. 
Preferring death to dishonor, like General Hugo Schwab, the Romanian 
commander of the destroyer squadron, Alexandru Dumbravă, committed suicide 
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when “the Russians on-boarded the commander ship of the destroyer squadron, 
N.M.S. Regina Maria”1. 
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